OFAC Targets Iran's Gulf Banking Lifeline; Two New Designations
On 28 August 2026, under Operation Economic Outcast, OFAC added two parties to the SDN List: Reza Mohammad Taeedi, the general manager of Bank Melli's Dubai branch, and Kameng Trading Limited, a Hong Kong front company that laundered funds for a sanctioned Iranian exchange house. Treasury separately proposed a Section 311 special measure cutting Banque Misr UAE off from US correspondent banking. Two designations, no removals. OFAC designated Reza Mohammad Taeedi, an Iranian national who serves as general manager of Bank Melli Iran's Dubai branch, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, as amended, for acting for or on behalf of Bank Melli. It also designated Kameng Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-registered front company, under Executive Order 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy after it helped the sanctioned Pedram Pirouzan Exchange House, also known as Opal Exchange, launder money for Iran. Both parties are now blocked: all property and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of US persons are frozen, and secondary sanctions risk applies to those who transact with them.
This issue
- New designations
- 2
- Removals
- 0
- Entries amended
- 0
- Sources monitored
- 85
Two Facilitators Blocked in the Iran Shadow-Banking Campaign
OFAC designated Reza Mohammad Taeedi, an Iranian national who serves as general manager of Bank Melli Iran's Dubai branch, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, as amended, for acting for or on behalf of Bank Melli. It also designated Kameng Trading Limited, a Hong Kong-registered front company, under Executive Order 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy after it helped the sanctioned Pedram Pirouzan Exchange House, also known as Opal Exchange, launder money for Iran. Both parties are now blocked: all property and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of US persons are frozen, and secondary sanctions risk applies to those who transact with them.
The two designations sit inside Operation Economic Outcast, the campaign Treasury announced on 24 August 2026 to sever Iran's remaining financial lifelines. On the same day, FinCEN issued a Section 311 notice of proposed rulemaking finding Banque Misr UAE to be of primary money laundering concern, proposing to bar US financial institutions from maintaining correspondent accounts for it; Treasury estimates the bank processed roughly 1.8 billion US dollars for 103 companies tied to Iranian shadow banking networks between January 2024 and June 2026. For screening teams the practical point is exposure by proximity: the newly blocked parties sit in Gulf and Hong Kong corporate structures that many institutions touch through correspondent and trade-finance relationships, so the value of today's action is in tracing indirect links, not only the two names.
Party detail
Every row below was read against the issuing authority's own notice, not against a press report. Aliases are reproduced in full, including non Latin script forms, because the alias field is where a screening run usually fails. Identifiers are published sanctions data.
| Party | Action and instrument | Identifiers | Grounds |
|---|---|---|---|
| TAEEDI, Reza Mohammad | DesignationGlobal Terrorism Sanctions Regulations; asset freeze under Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886 [SDGT] [IFSR] | Date of birth: 24 Aug 1975Nationality: IranianPassport: P6602606Passport (alternative): E96037407National ID: 784-1975-3624749-3 (United Arab Emirates)Address: Dubai, United Arab Emirates | Added to OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List on 28 August 2026 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of Bank Melli Iran. Bank Melli has facilitated billions of dollars of transactions through accounts controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), moving funds inside and outside Iran and financing Iranian-aligned proxies. All property and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of US persons are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with him. He also carries the [IFSR] tag and secondary sanctions risk applies. |
| KAMENG TRADING LIMITED | DesignationIranian Financial Sanctions; asset freeze under Executive Order 13902 [IRAN-EO13902] | Nationality: Hong KongEstablished: 24 Jul 2024Business registration number: 76846373 (Hong Kong)Address: Room 701, Unit 108, 7/F, Tower B, New Mandarin Plaza, 14 Science Museum Road, Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China; Unit 89, 3F, Yau Lee Centre, No. 45, Hoi Yuen Rd, Kwun Tong, Hong Kong, China | Added to OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List on 28 August 2026 under Executive Order 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. The Hong Kong-based front company helped sanctioned Iranian persons access the international financial system, and was used by the sanctioned Pedram Pirouzan Exchange House (also known as Opal Exchange) to launder money for Iran. All property and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of US persons are blocked, and US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with it. |
What this means for your organisation
- 01
Screen and block the two newly designated parties now: Load Reza Mohammad Taeedi (Iranian national, Dubai; passports P6602606 and E96037407) and Kameng Trading Limited (Hong Kong, Business Registration Number 76846373) into your screening system and freeze any matching accounts or transactions, applying the OFAC 50 percent rule to entities they own.
- 02
Trace the Bank Melli and exchange-house links, not just the names: Taeedi is tied to Bank Melli Iran's Dubai branch and Kameng Trading to the sanctioned Pedram Pirouzan (Opal) Exchange House. Review correspondent, trade-finance and payment relationships that route through those nodes for indirect exposure.
- 03
Assess Gulf correspondent exposure against the Banque Misr UAE proposal: FinCEN has proposed a Section 311 special measure against Banque Misr UAE. Map whether your institution clears or nests any activity that touches it, and prepare for the correspondent access to be cut when the rule is finalised.
- 04
Watch secondary sanctions risk on Iran shadow-banking counterparties: Both parties carry secondary sanctions exposure. Non-US financial institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for them risk losing US correspondent access, so re-test high-risk Iran-nexus counterparties and trade flows.
- 05
Log the unread and errored registers rather than marking them clear: Several sanctions-authority and central bank pages, including Bank Al-Maghrib, could not be read or retrieved this cycle and are carried forward for re-check. Record them as unverified, not clear, so the distinction is on the file if an examiner asks.
Where this issue came from
The map plots the sources Youverify monitors. The pulsing markers are the one authorities cited in this issue: OFAC. Hover any marker to name the sources read there.
Method statement
Parties are taken from the issuing authorities' list data and notices as recorded in the Youverify Sanctions Monitor of 31 August 2026, one row per party. Website copy for this archive edition is compiled from that day's published briefing.
Corrections
No corrections issued for this issue. Corrections are published on the issue they affect, dated, with the original text retained.Cite this issue
Vyra from Youverify. "OFAC Targets Iran's Gulf Banking Lifeline; Two New Designations." Youverify Sanctions Monitor, issue 114, 31 August 2026. https://youverify.co/en/sanctions/2026-08-31. Accessed 31 August 2026.